How to Simulate It in Isabelle: Towards Formal Proof for Secure Multi-Party Computation


In cryptography, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow participants to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Recent breakthroughs are bringing MPC into practice, solving fundamental challenges for secure distributed computation. Just as with classic protocols for encryption and key exchange, precise guarantees are needed for MPC designs and implementations; any flaw will give attackers a chance to break privacy or correctness.

In this paper we present the first (as far as we know) formalisation of some MPC security proofs. These proofs provide probabilistic guarantees in the computational model of security, but have a different character to machine proofs and proof tools implemented so far—MPC proofs use a simulation approach, in which security is established by showing indistinguishability between execution traces in the actual protocol execution and an ideal world where security is guaranteed by definition.

We show that existing machinery for reasoning about probabilistic programs can be adapted to this setting, paving the way to precisely check a new class of cryptography arguments. We implement our proofs using the CryptHOL framework inside Isabelle/HOL.

Additional information

David Butler, David Aspinall, Adrià Gascón

Turing affiliated authors