Participatory budgeting for chores

Exploring the challenges of allocating budgets for chores

Research areas

Introduction

Participatory budgeting is an approach to allocating budgets to different projects based on users’ preferences. For instance, a local council can propose a list of 10 projects with different costs (such as, a new park or a bike path), announce a budget, elicit the residents’ preferences over the projects, and then select a set of projects to implement to satisfy as many participants as possible while staying within the budget.

The same approach can be extended to settings where one needs to choose among unpopular measures to resolve a pressing issue faced by the community, such as reducing energy consumption to combat climate change, introducing social distancing measures to slow the spread of a virus, or cutting services to deal with a budget deficit. The negative outcomes to individuals produced in these settings are known as ‘chores’ or ‘bads’ as opposed to ‘goods’. The goal of this project is to explore algorithmic challenges associated with allocating budgets for these ‘bads’ or ‘chores’.

Explaining the science

In the context of participatory budgeting for goods (i.e., the standard model), many natural optimisation objectives lead to NP-hard problems, and researchers have explored ways of tackling them via approximation algorithms and multivariate algorithmics. Indeed, even defining what it means for an allocation to be fair is a challenging issue which depends on the preference format and the application at hand. Some novel fairness criteria, such as extended justified representation or proportionality for solid coalitions have been put forward in recent work; however, it remains unclear if they are suitable for chores/bads. Overall, the setting of participatory budgeting with bads remains largely unexplored. In a related setting of fair division, it is well-known that concepts and methods that work well for goods do not always extend straightforwardly to chores.

Project aims

In this project, we aim to formulate new conditions, capturing both fairness and welfare objectives, for the setting of selecting chores, or bads. We will verify whether existing algorithms for goods can be extended to this setting, and whether they still behave in a desirable manner when used for bads rather than goods. We will also develop new computationally efficient and fair allocation procedures tailored to our model. Towards the end of the project, we plan to explore the allocation of both goods and bads, or where the projects to be selected may be seen as goods by some agents and bads by other agents (e.g., converting a parking space to an outdoor café, or closing a nightclub).

Applications

We hope to engage local authorities and get them to incorporate our ideas in their decision-making. We have already explored collaboration opportunities with some potential stakeholders.

Organisers

Edith Elkind

Turing Game Theory Theme Leader, Professor of Computer Science, University of Oxford

Researchers and collaborators

Publications

  • Sonja Kraiczy, Edith Elkind, An Adaptive and Verifiably Proportional Method for Participatory Budgeting (presented at WINE’23)
  • Giannis Tyrovolas, Andrei Constantinescu, Edith Elkind, Unravelling Expressive Delegations: Complexity and Normative Analysis (presented at AAAI’24) 
  • Martin Bullinger, Chris Dong, Patrick Lederer, Clara Mehler, Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections (presented at AAAI 2024) 
  • Martin Bullinger, René Romen, Stability in Online Coalition Formation (presented at AAAI 2024) 
  • Nicholas Teh, Svetlana Obraztsova, Edith Elkind, Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Multiwinner Voting (will be presented at AAMAS’24 as a poster) 
  • Manon Revel, Niclas Boehmer, Rachael Colley, Markus Brill, Piotr Faliszewski and Edith Elkind, Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View (will be presented AAMAS’24 Blue Sky Track) 
  • Nicholas Teh, Svetlana Obraztsova, Edith Elkind, Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting (will be submitted to AAAI’25) 
  • Martin Bullinger, Edith Elkind, Mohamad Latifian, Towards Fair and Efficient Public Transportation: A Bus Stop Model (will be submitted to NeurIPS’24) 
  • Martin Bullinger, Edith Elkind, Mechanism Design for Ordinal Classes of Hedonic Games (will be submitted to AAAI’25) 
  • Nicholas Teh, Ayumi Igarashi, Edith Elkind, Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints (will be submitted to SAGT’24) 
  • Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon, United for Change: Deliberative Coalition Formation to Change the Status Quo (accepted to Social Choice and Welfare) 
  • Luis Sanchez-Fernandez, Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Norberto Fernandez, Jesus A. Fisteus, Pablo Basanta Val, Piotr Skowron, Proportional Justified Representation (revision submitted to Artificial Intelligence Journal)